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SILENCE AND THE WORD
PAUL CAMWOS*

Professor Post has identified and described an essential tension
at the heart of so-called "collectivist" accounts of free speech.,
Certainly from the orthodox (i.e., libertarian) perspective of modern First Amendment doctrine, there is little to be said in favor
of the enthusiasm for bureaucratic correctitude displayed by Professors Fiss, Sunstein, et. al. I share Professor Post's skepticism
regarding the virtues of "managed deliberation," and have little
to add to his exemplary critique.
I would, however, like to say a few words about a metaphor.
This particular metaphor is central to not only many of the papers
which have been given at this conference, but to the bulk of
modern free speech theory: I refer to Holmes's "marketplace of
ideas." The marketplace of ideas has become more than a mere
figure of speech-it is now, one might say, the constitutive metaphor that organizes an entire cognitive field in certain predictable
ways. Thus, Professor Post's essay divides First Amendment discourse into varieties of laissez faire individualism that celebrate
the autonomy of atomistic choice, inevitably colliding with managerial modes of bureaucratic rationality that mimic the planned
structure of the modern welfare state.
Now as has been noted many times, implicit in the classical
economic theory of the market is the idea that everything worth
acquiring can be bought. I believe a parallel fiction burdens our
marketplace of ideas: the (usually unstated and therefore all the
more powerful) assumption that everything worth knowing can be
said.
I can best illustrate this claim by pointing to certain ways of
speaking, and of keeping silent, that contest the omnisignificant
pretentions of discursive rationalism. The languages of art, philosophy, and religion often remind us that the deepest meanings
must ineluctably seep into the fields of silence at the limits of
human discourse. Consider the beginning of King Lear. Maddened
by his monstrous appetite for verbal displays of unlimited devotion,
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of
Public Discourse, 64 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1109 (1993).
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Lear offers up his kingdom to his daughters, if only they will
oblige him:
Which of you shall we say doth love us most?
That we our largest bounty may extend 2
Where nature doth with merit challenge.
His eldest daughters, Goneril and Regan, are only too happy
to comply, declaring that they love him "more than words can
wield the matter," before proceeding to lavish him with a verbal
flood of fulsome flattery. Cordelia, the youngest daughter, is
horrified by this spectacle, and refuses to play her scripted role in
this particular piece of "managed deliberation." She knows that
"my love's more richer than my tongue," and so when her father
demands "what can you say to draw a third/ More opulent than
your sisters? Speak," she replies
Nothing, my lord.
Nothing?
Nothing.
Lear is thunderstruck. "Nothing can come of nothing. Speak
again." Cordelia answers, "Unhappy that I am, I cannot heave
my heart into my mouth. I love your majesty according to my
bond; nor more nor less." ' 3

Something of Cordelia's resistance to the seductions of language can be found in this passage from the Taoist philosopher
Chuang Tzu:
Duke Huan of Ch'i was reading a book at the upper end
of the hall; the wheelwright was making a wheel at the lower
end. Putting aside his mallet and chisel he called to the Duke
and asked him what book he was reading. 'One that records
the words of the Sages,' answered the Duke. 'Are those Sages
alive?' asked the wheelwright. 'Oh no,' said the Duke, 'they
are dead.' 'In that case,' said the wheelwright, 'what you are
reading can be nothing but the lees and scum of bygone men.'
'How dare you, a wheelwright, find fault with the book I am
reading. If you can explain your statement, I will let it pass. If
not, you shall die.' 'Speaking as a wheelwright,' he replied, 'I
look at the matter in this way; when I am making a wheel, if
my stroke is too slow, then it bites deep but is not steady; if
my stroke is too fast, then it is steady, but it does not go deep.
2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING LEAR, act 1, sc. 1 (Russell Fraser
ed., Signet Classics 1963).
3. Id.
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The right pace, neither slow nor fast, cannot get into the hand
unless it comes from the heart. It is a thing that cannot be put
into words [rules]; there is an art in it that I cannot explain to
my son. That is why it is impossible for me to let him take
over my work, and here I am at the age of seventy still making
wheels. In my opinion it must have been the same with the men
of old. All that was worth handing on, died with them; the
rest, they put in their books. That is why I said that 4what you
were reading was the lees and scum of bygone men.'
Both the limitations of language and the sacred qualities of
silence were well understood by the Midrashim, the Jewish sages
who forbade anyone from speaking the Shem Hamephorash, that
is, the Secret Name of the God they would only call AdonaiLord. For them, to even presume to call the Lord by his true
name signified a grave impiety. As Borges puts it
[elven in the human languages there is no proposition that
does not imply the entire universe; to say the tiger is to say the
tigers that begot it, the deer and turtles devoured by it, the
grass on which the deer fed, the earth that was mother to the
grass, the heaven that gave birth to the earth.., in the language
of a god every word would enunciate that infinite concatenation
of facts, and not in an implicit but in an explicit manner, and
not progressively but instantaneously ....

A god ...

ought to

utter only a single word and in that word absolute fullness. No
word uttered by him can be inferior to the universe or less than
the sum total of time. Shadows or simulacra of that single word
equivalent to a language and to all a language can embrace are
the poor and ambitious human words, all, world, universe.'
To deny the reality of the unnameable involves a kind of
linguistic hubris. The marketplace of ideas commodifies, or, if you
will, profanes the inexpressible richness of experience by reducing
our communicative gestures to an impoverished series of tradeable
propositions which are assumed to capture all we know, and all
we need to know.
It is this language, the language of hypertrophied utilitarianism, of bureaucratic rationality, which gives mechanical life to the
formulaic doctrines that monopolize the marketplace of free speech
jurisprudence. Indeed, the metaphor becomes the message, and
our speech about speech begins to resemble those stylized notations
4. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS, AND OTHER ESSAYS 9 n.2 (1962)
(quoting Chuang Tzu).
5. JORGE Luis BORGES, The God's Script, in LABYRINTHS; SELECTED STORMS AND
OTHER WuTINGS 169, 171 (Donald A. Yates & James E. Irby eds., 1964).
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that cryptically encode reams of financial information: Benthemite
figurations of meaning, thin, lifeless, unreal.
And yet one can still find traces of resistance to the hyperrationality of contemporary legal discourse in the most unlikely
venues. Consider two Supreme Court opinions, each of which, not
coincidentally, still elicit widespread cries of outrage from legal
scholars: Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Flood v.
Kuhn, and Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Texas v. Johnson.
In Flood v. Kuhn, 6 the Court refused to overrule a halfcentury old case that had granted major league baseball an exemption from the antitrust laws. The contested precedent was based
on a discarded interpretation of the Commerce Clause, and all
nine justices agreed that if they were to visit the matter de novo,
baseball would not be granted such an exemption. The formal
legal argument in Justice Blackmun's opinion involves a rather dry
discussion of how much force should be granted to stare decisis
in questions of federal statutory interpretation.
Yet the first part of the opinion is something else altogether:
a florid encomium to baseball's history which climaxes in a kind
of incantation, made up of the names of ninety-three famous and
not so famous figures from the game's fabulous past, beginning
with Ty Cobb, Babe Ruth, Tris Speaker, Walter Johnson and
Henry Chadwick, and ending with Carl Hubbell, Old Hoss Radbourne, Moe Berg, Rabbit Maranville, Jimmie Foxx and Lefty
Grove.

7

This list is reminiscent of nothing so much as that portion of
the canon of the Catholic mass in which the priest intones the
names of thirty-seven saints, anointing the congregation in a voluptuous wave of nostalgic remembrance. And when we study the
subtext of Flood, a similar rhetorical function for Justice Blackmun's strange chant begins to reveal itself. Flood upholds baseball's antitrust exemption because of a 'recognition and an
acceptance of baseball's unique characteristics and needs ....

If

there is any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency
and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress
and not by this Court.'"
Justice Blackmun's list, then, like Cordelia's silence, signals
the evocation of an organic ordering of social life that is not
amenable to rational analysis. Cordelia can only point to that
6. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
7. Id.at 262-63.
8. Id. at 284.
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inchoate bond between father and daughter that Lear, in his
feverish lust for the clarity of language, insists must be made
verbally explicit. Similarly, Justice Blackmun attempts to evoke
the mysterious, inexplicable hold that baseball has on the core of
American culture through a kind of prelapsarian naming of names
that will both provide the uninitiated with insight into the special
nature of baseball history, and represent a transrational justification for his-in the best sense-deeply conservative impulse not to
tamper with the traditional social order of the game.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Texas v. Johnson,9 the
flag burning case, bears an uncanny structural resemblance to
Flood. The first part of the opinion is a retrospective paen to the
American flag, celebrating its role over the course of two centuries
of American history. The central element of the dissent's language
is supplied not by traditional legal rhetoric, but rather by poetry:
the Chief Justice quotes stanzas of Emerson's "Concord Hymn,"
of the Star Spangled Banner, of various patriotic songs, and all
of John Greenleaf Whittier's "Barbara Frietchie."
The dissent attempts to evoke in the reader a visceral, rather
than an intellectualized, understanding of its claim that
[t]he flag is not simply another "idea" or "point of view"
competing for recognition in the marketplace of ideas. Millions
and millions of Americans regard it with an almost mystical
reverence regardless of what sort of social, political, or philosophical beliefs they may have ....
... [tihe government has not "established" this feeling; 200
years of history have done that. 10
Whatever views one may hold regarding the First Amendment, this
is surely a more accurate rendering of the American flag's cultural
significance than that found amid the bloodless rationalizations of
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court.
Why then do legal scholars routinely emit hoots of derision
when confronting Blackmun's and Rehnquist's idiosyncratic and
intriguing texts?" I would suggest that the answer has something
to do with the sociology of knowledge. Professor Fish reminds us
that the world of actual speech does not usually function like a
9. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).

10. Id. at 429, 434.
11. A textbook example of this tendency is found in Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of
the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARv. L. Rav. 124 (1992). For
a full scale critique of this type of legal scholarship, see Paul Campos, Advocacy and
Scholarship, 81 CAL. L. REv. 216 (1993).
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philosophy seminar; 2 while Professor Post emphasizes how impoverished Meiklejohn's model of political life as a well-run town
meeting really is.3 These are helpful reminders of how academics,
perhaps especially legal academics, systematically overvalue hyperrational, tightly structured forms of public deliberation, in much
the same way that football coaches overvalue the ability to bench
press 470 pounds. This, after all, is what we are good at doing,
and at teaching others to do.
Naturally enough, it disturbs us to consider the possibility
that the logic of collective identity depends more on the public's
irrational attachment to a piece of cloth, or the name of a halfforgotten ball player, than on all the arguments in all the law
review articles entombed within the sepulchral silence of our libraries.
What is essential, perhaps, is not that everyone shall speak,
but that everything worth knowing shall not be said. Poets, priests,
philosophers, and sometimes even judges understand this. We who
are professionally obliged to forget it, and to intermittently mistake
the cramped and tumultuous marketplace of ideas for the great
globe itself of earthly knowledge would do well to remember that,
in the words of that most poetic of philosophers, Ludwig Wittgenstein,
[D]oubt can exist only where a question exists, a question
only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said.
There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words.
4
They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.
...

12. Stanley Fish, Fraught With Death: Skepticism, Progressivism, and the First
Amendment, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1061, 1062 (1993).
13. Post, supra note 1, at 1112.
14. LuDwIo WITTOENSTEIN, TRACTATUS Loosco-PmLOSOPHIcUs 149-51 (D.F. Pears &
B.F. McGuinness trans., 2d ed. 1971).

